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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon Rule 4 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and pursuant to §78-2-
2(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order signed and entered by the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel on March 29, 1991, which clarified a 
previous judgment and order regarding non-judicial foreclosure of 
the property which was the subject of the litigation. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were Defendants Ovard required by §78-37-1 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended) to pursue the non-judicial foreclosure of 
Plaintiffs' property as the second trust deed holders before 
seeking a deficiency judgment against the Plaintiffs? 
Standard of Review: 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law and such conclusions of law are accorded no 
particular deference but reviewed for correctness. Ward v. 
Richfield Cityr 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
2. Should the Defendants' damages have been limited to the 
difference between the fair market value of Plaintiffs' property 
and the judgment awarded them on June 6, 1988, due to their 
voluntary refusal to immediately pursue the non-judicial 
foreclosure sale? 
Standard of Review: 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law and such conclusions of law are accorded no 
particular deference but reviewed for correctness. Ward v. 
Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
§78-37-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) attached as 
"Addendum." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. A judgment was rendered against the Plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action on June 6, 1988. (R. 210-215) 
2. The terms of that judgment awarded Defendants 
$40,600.50 and provided that, among other things, the property 
which was the subject of that litigation be sold by a trustee's 
sale and that Defendants be awarded a deficiency judgment after 
crediting Plaintiffs with the fair market value of the property 
on the date of sale. (R. 213) 
3. The subject property was subsequently sold by 
MountainWest Savings (the first trust deed holder) on September 
1, 1989. This sale occurred nearly 3 months after judgment was 
awarded to the Defendants, giving them the right to immediately 
sell the property after posting notice of the sale. (R. 297, 
Exhibit "A") 
4. At the time of the sale the subject property was worth 
approximately $130,000 but it was sold by MountainWest for a bid 
of approximately $107,000. (R. 297, Exhibit lfAM, 324-325) 
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5. Defendants were obligated under §78-37-1 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) to pursue the property first and yet they 
failed to do so, despite having the ability and opportunity. (R. 
303-305) 
6. Rather, Defendants voluntarily delayed their sale and 
allowed the bank to proceed with its foreclosure so that they 
could bid on the property in that sale and still retain their 
judgment against the Plaintiffs. (R. 347-350) 
7. On August 7, 1990, Defendants filed a motion with the 
trial court seeking entry of a deficiency judgment in the amount 
of their judgment plus interest and attorney's fees. Defendants 
subsequently withdrew that motion on August 31, 1990. (R. 289-
297, 329) 
8. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Order Clarifying 
Judgment which sought to have the trial judge limit the 1988 
judgment to those amounts which exceed the fair market value of 
the property at the time Defendants could have sold it but failed 
to. (R. 331-337) 
9. The trial judge ruled that his judgment did not require 
the Defendants Ovard to proceed on a non-judicial foreclosure 
sale under their trust deed and that Order is being appealed in 
this matter. (Order dated March 29, 1991) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants/Sanders contend that §78-37-1 Utah Code Ann. 
compelled the Ovards to pursue the property which secured their 
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judgment for satisfaction of that judgment. The Ovards' failure 
to execute upon the property should bar them from recovering from 
the Sanders. 
Alternatively, the Sanders argue that they are being 
penalized by the Ovards7 failure to protect their security 
interest in the property under §78-37-1. The Ovards7 judgment 
should be reduced by the amount of equity which was lost when 
MountainWest Savings foreclosed on their first trust deed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The facts in this case present an unusual situation for the 
application of §78-37-1 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"One-Action Rule"). The cases interpreting this statute 
generally involve second trust deed holders seeking to enforce a 
contract after the property securing the obligation has been 
lost. In this case, the Defendants Ovard were awarded and 
continue to hold a judgment against the Plaintiff Sanders. 
The issue raised here concerns the application of the one-
action rule to the Ovard judgment which was initially secured by 
the Sanders property. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM EXECUTING ON THE FULL 
AMOUNT OF THEIR JUDGMENT WHERE THEY FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE ONE-ACTION RULE §78-37-1 UTAH CODE ANN. 
When this action was initiated in July of 1985, the Sanders 
sought and received, pursuant to stipulation, a permanent 
injunction restraining the Ovards from foreclosing on the 
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property. Two years later the Ovards filed a counterclaim 
seeking a judicial foreclosure of the Sanders property. On June 
6, 1988, Judge Noel signed the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
which awarded the Ovards a money judgment in the amount of 
$40,600.50, A copy of that Judgment is attached hereto as 
"Addendum". In addition, that judgment affirmed the Ovards' lien 
on the property and addressed the foreclosure on the property. 
Paragraph 6 reads as follows: 
Defendants shall be entitled to complete their 
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. All 
requirements for such foreclosure are deemed to have 
complied with except for the giving and posting of 
notice of sale, which must still be accomplished by 
Defendants. Pursuant to law applicable to trust deed 
sales there shall be no redemption rights after sale, 
and any deficiency shall be limited to the difference 
between amounts owed by Plaintiffs to Defendants 
hereunder, plus any subsequent allowable costs and 
fees, and the fair market value of the Property at the 
date of sale. In the event of a deficiency and an 
action by Defendants therefor, such action may be 
pursued by motion and evidentiary hearing in this 
action without the necessity of Defendants commencing a 
new and separate action. (emphasis added) 
It is, and has been, the Sanders' position that Paragraph 6 
contemplates that the Ovards promptly pursue the sale of the 
property to satisfy all or a portion of their judgment. Instead, 
the Ovards were negotiating with MountainWest in an attempt to 
purchase the property from them at their foreclosure sale. In a 
questionable procedure, MountainWest accepted a bid from Ovard at 
the sale on June 6, 1988, subject to certain terms and 
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conditions. Ovard was unable to meet those conditions and the 
property was subsequently sold on September 1, 1988. 
The Ovards then sought to execute on the full amount of 
their judgment against the Sanders claiming that their security 
in the property had been extinguished by the MountainWest 
foreclosure. Sanders objected on the basis that there was equity 
in the property which would have satisfied the Ovard judgment and 
the Ovards had a duty to pursue that remedy under §78-37-1. 
The Ovards rely upon the exception to the one-action rule 
which would relieve them from pursuing the security where it has 
been lost or disposed of without any fault on their part. 
Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 
1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black. 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1980). In response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify Judgment, 
the Ovards argued that they fell within this exception as 
MountainWest foreclosed upon the property and extinguished their 
lien. 
A. The Ovards Failed to Protect Their Interest in the 
Property, 
The exception to the one-action rule applies only where it 
is established that the security was lost without fault or 
blameworthy conduct on the part of the creditor. Lockhart Co. v. 
Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1983); Utah 
Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black. 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980); 
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Utah 
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1936). The question of what types of conduct preclude a creditor 
from seeking a deficiency was addressed in First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. v, Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987) which 
interpreted Utah law. In his opinion, Judge Winder found that 
recovery by a secured creditor was barred when: 
(1) the creditor lost its lien because of failure to 
record a notice of assignment of mortgage, Donaldson v. 
Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P. 799 (1897); (2) the creditor 
released its lien because of its belief that there was 
no equity in the collateral, Lockhart. supra; (3) the 
creditor disposed of the collateral by private sale 
under an illegal self-help remedy, Rein v. Callaway, 7 
Idaho 634, 65 P. 63 (1901) (cited with approval by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Black, supra); and (4) the 
creditor lost its interest in the collateral because of 
its failure to present a claim in a related probate 
proceeding, Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. 
Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42 P. 447 (1895) (cited with 
approval in Black). 
Id, at 182 (cited with approval in City Consumer Services, Inc. 
v, Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991))• Sanders contends that the 
Ovards' failure to pursue the remedy awarded to it by the trial 
court is "blameworthy" and should bar them from seeking a 
deficiency from the Sanders. 
The trial judge recognized that there was equity in the 
subject property which is why he allowed them to proceed with the 
sale and limited any deficiency to the difference between the 
fair market value of the property and any amounts still owing to 
the Defendants, Ovards' failure to protect their equity is 
clearly blameworthy and should preclude them from pursuing 
Sanders for a deficiency. At a minimum, the Ovards should have 
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their judgment reduced by the difference between the fair market 
value of the property when sold by MountainWest and the amount 
paid by MountainWest. 
B. Sanders is Penalized by the Ovards' Failure to Protect 
Their Interest in the Property, 
The equities involved in this case demand that the Ovards be 
barred from pursuing their judgment or, in the alternative, that 
the judgment be reduced as set forth above. Judge Noel awarded 
the Ovards a money judgment and anticipated that they would 
initially proceed against the real property to collect it. The 
equity was there until MountainWest foreclosed on the property in 
September of 1988. In fact, the Ovards were attempting to 
purchase the property from MountainWest at approximately the same 
time as judgment was entered. 
In failing to protect their interest in the property, the 
Ovards have effectively penalized Sanders in an amount equivalent 
to the equity which existed in the property when it was sold by 
MountainWest. Had the Ovards bid unconditionally at the sale 
conducted by MountainWest, Sanders would only be required to pay 
to them a deficiency as contemplated by Judge Noel's Order. 
Instead, the Ovards' inaction has allowed them to pursue Sanders 
for the full amount of the judgment plus the interest which is 
accruing thereon. 
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A similar issue was recently presented to this court in City 
Consumer Services. Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991). 
That case, however, is not dispositive of the present situation. 
In Peters, as in most cases involving this statute, the issue is 
whether the previously secured creditor can bring an action on 
the underlying obligation. Here, however, the Ovards had already 
brought their action in a counterclaim, prevailed at trial, 
received a money judgment and all but completed their 
foreclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sanders are asking this court for two alternative forms 
of relief. The first would be to find that, pursuant to §78-37-1 
Utah Code Annotated and the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, 
the Ovards were obligated to pursue the security for their 
judgment and as a result of their failure to do so, they should 
be barred from recovering their judgment against the Sanders. 
In the alternative, Sanders ask that this court reduce the 
Ovard judgment by the difference between the amount paid by 
MountainWest for the property of $107,000 and the fair market 
value of the property of $130,000 at the time of sale on the 
basis that equity demands that Sanders not be penalized for the 
Ovards' decision to sit back and allow MountainWest to foreclose. 
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DATED this day of November, 1991. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GREEN & BERRY 
REDEHICK N. GREE 
,VJMq 
EEN 
IV. LUND 
leys f o r P l a i n t i f f s / 
j ^ l l a n t s 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
COMES NOW Julie V. Lund, attorney for the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants in the above-entitled action, and hereby 
certifies that she has served the Defendants/Appellees with a 
Brief of Appellants by mailing four (4) true and correct copies 
thereof to Thomas N. Crowther of the firm of Parsons & Crowther, 
attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, at 455 South 300 East, Suite 
3 00, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this 2 6th day of November, 
1991. 
DATED this ZLp day of November, 1991. 
GREEN & BERRY 
uM IAAAA 
FULIE V. LUND 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
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78-36-11 JUDICIAL CODE 396 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately 1087 
78-36-11. Time for a p p e a l . 
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the 
judgment rendered 1953 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excep ted . 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant 's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial procesb, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. IDSI 
78-36-12.3. Definit ions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days alter 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant 's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant 's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned p r emises — Retaking 
and rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of tenant 
left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable. 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and 
has left personal property on the premises, the owner 
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it ior the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant The owner shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has 
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has 
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner 
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward 
any amount the tenant owes Any money left over 
from the sale of the property shall be handled as spec-
ified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this 
act shall be in derogation of or alter the owners 
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38 1986 
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE F O R E C L O S U R E 
Section 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special 
execution 
78-37-2 Deficiency judgment — Execution. 
78-37-3 Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights 
barred 
78-37-4 Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys 
78-37-5 Sales — When debt due in installments 
78-37-6 Right of redemption — Sales by parcels 
— Of land and water stock. 
78-37-7 Repealed. 
78-37-8 Restraining possessor from injuring 
property. 
78-37-9 Attorney fees. 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special 
execut ion . 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt 
or the enforcement of any right secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judg-
ment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with 
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount 
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to pro-
ceed and sell the same according to the provisions of 
law relating to sales on execution, and a special exe-
cution or order of sale shall be issued for that pur-
pose. 1963 
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution. 
If it appears from the return of the officer making 
the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a bal-
ance still remains due, judgment theiefor must then 
be docketed by the clerk and execution may be issued 
for such balance as in other cases, but no general 
execution shall issue until after the sale of the mort-
gaged property and the application of the amount re-
alized as aforesaid. 19&3 
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights 
barred. 
No person holding a conveyance from or under the 
mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a 
lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not ap-
pear o( record in the proper office at the time of the 
commencement of the action, need be made a party to 
such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and 
the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive 
against the party holding such unrecorded convey-
.Is,.* G tS88 
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Thomas N. Crowther - #0773 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
455 South Third East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-9865 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS and CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
MARTIN S. OVARD, REVA S. OVARD, 
BEN r. OVARD, HELEN T. OVARD, 
AND JAX HAYES PETTEY, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
and INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Counterdefendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. C85-4313 
Judge Noel 
The above entitled action came on regularly for trial on 
October 26 and 27, 1987, before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, 
- 1 -
Judge of the above-entitled court, sitting without a jury, with 
David R. Olsen and Gary R. Henrie of the law firm of SUITTER, 
AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs, 
and with Thomas N. Crowther of the law firm of PARSONS & CROWTHER 
appearing as counsel for Defendants and with no appearance having 
been made by or on behalf of Counterdefendants Utah State Tax 
Commission, Salt Lake County and Insurance Company of North 
America, with Defendants having stipulated to the dismissal of 
Counterdef endants Utah State Tax Commission and Salt Lake County 
and Defendants and Counterdefendant Insurance Company of North 
America having stipulated as to issues between them. Having 
heard testimony of witnesses, having received and reviewed 
exhibits, having heard arguments of counsel at trial and having 
heard arguments of counsel at a hearing on February 12, 1988, on 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, having taken the issues 
and matters raised at trial and upon Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees under advisement, the Court with the parties 
agreement having personally viewed the property in question, 
having heard arguments of Counsel on Plaintiff's objections to 
Defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, and being now fully advised 
in the premises and of the law and facts in this matter, and 
having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants 1 c la ims a g a i n s t C o u n t e r d e f e n d a n t s Utah S t a t e 
Tax C o m m i s s i o n and S a l t Lake C o u n t y a r e d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t 
p r e j u d i c e . 
2 . P l a i n t i f f s a r e no t e n t i t l e d t o and a re not awarded any 
r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d i n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t , a n d t h e i n j u n c t i o n 
h e r e t o f o r e e n t e r e d by t h e C o u r t e n j o i n i n g D e f e n d a n t s from 
pursuing any f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s under the T r u s t Deed r e f e r r e d t o 
i n P l a i n t i f f s 1 c o m p l a i n t and D e f e n d a n t s 1 c o u n t e r c l a i m and 
hereinbelow i d e n t i f i e d i s t e r m i n a t e d . 
3 . D e f e n d a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d t o and a r e h e r e b y a w a r d e d 
judgment a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s , j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y , in the amount 
of $40 ,600.50 , which c o n s i s t s of $25 ,900 p r i n c i p a l , $ 1 4 , 2 8 5 . 5 4 
a c c r u e d and u n p a i d i n t e r e s t t o and i n c l u d i n g October 26, 1987, 
and $10 .64 p e r day i n t e r e s t from and a f t e r s u c h d a t e t o and 
i n c l u d i n g December 4, 1987, $2 ,000 a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and $508.51 
c o s t s , t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t on s u c h t o t a l amount a t t h e 
s t a t u t o r y judgment r a t e from and a f t e r December 4, 1987. 
4 . P u r s u a n t t o t h a t c e r t a i n T r u s t Deed e x e c u t e d by 
P l a i n t i f f s as T r u s t o r s in f a v o r of D e f e n d a n t s a s B e n e f i c i a r i e s 
and recorded November 8, 1982, in Book 5418 a t Page 1755 as E n t r y 
No. 3727947, D e f e n d a n t s have a good and v a l i d l i e n upon c e r t a i n 
r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d in S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e of Utah , more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e T r u s t Deed and in E x h i b i t MAM 
attached hereto (the "Property") for payment of the amounts and 
judgment referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph. 
5. Any claimed right, title or interest of Counterdefendant 
Insurance Company of North America is subordinate and inferior to 
the Trust Deed and Defendants1 interest in the Property. 
6. Defendants shall be entitled to complete their 
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. All requirements for 
such foreclosure are deemed to have complied with except for the 
giving and posting of notice of sale, which must still be 
accomplished by Defendants. Pursuant to law applicable to trust 
deed sales there shall be no redemption rights after sale, and 
any deficiency shall be limited to the difference between amounts 
owed by Plaintiffs to Defendants hereunder, plus any subsequent 
allowable costs and fees, and the fair market value of the 
Property at the date of sale. In the event of a deficiency and 
an action by Defendants therefor, such action may be pursued by 
motion and evidentiary hearing in this action without the 
necessity of Defendants commencing a new and separate action. 
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DATED J&ay ($_, 1 9 8 8 . 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG 
& HANSON 
By. 
/ 
'diu-L tCau c 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINPlIhY 
By hiL^n M. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North 0°23l08" East from the 
East quarter corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 76°11,02" 
West 186.90 feet; thence North 0°23f08" East 202.5 feet; thence 
North 76ollf02,, East 186.90 feet; thence South 0°23f08n West 
202.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a 35 foot wide right of way connecting to 13800 
South Street, and subject to a 35 foot wide right of way adjacent 
to and parallel with the West line of subject property described 
as follows: 
A 35 foot wide strip of land, the center line of which begins 
299.95 feet North 89°39,27M West from the East quarter corner of 
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and runs thence North 0°23l08,! East 311.30 feet; thence 
North 16°51,02" East 332.85 feet; thence North 0°23,08" East 
200.88 feet. 
